A detailed fracture mechanics evaluation is the most accurate and reliable prediction of process equipment susceptibility to brittle fracture. This article provides an overview and discussion on brittle fracture. The discussion covers the reasons to evaluate brittle fracture, provides a brief summary of historical failures that were found to be a result of brittle fracture, and describes key components that drive susceptibility to a brittle fracture failure, namely stress, material toughness, and cracklike defect. It also presents industry codes and standards that assess susceptibility to brittle fracture. Additionally, a series of case study examples are presented that demonstrate assessment procedures used to mitigate the risk of brittle fracture in process equipment.

This article offers an overview of fatigue fundamentals, common fatigue terminology, and examples of damage morphology. It presents a summary of relevant engineering mechanics, cyclic plasticity principles, and perspective on the modern design by analysis (DBA) techniques. The article reviews fatigue assessment methods incorporated in international design and post construction codes and standards, with special emphasis on evaluating welds. Specifically, the stress-life approach, the strain-life approach, and the fracture mechanics (crack growth) approach are described. An overview of high-cycle welded fatigue methods, cycle-counting techniques, and a discussion on ratcheting are also offered. A historical synopsis of fatigue technology advancements and commentary on component design and fabrication strategies to mitigate fatigue damage and improve damage tolerance are provided. Finally, the article presents practical fatigue assessment case studies of in-service equipment (pressure vessels) that employ DBA methods.

This article discusses pressure vessels, piping, and associated pressure-boundary items of the types used in nuclear and conventional power plants, refineries, and chemical-processing plants. It begins by explaining the necessity of conducting a failure analysis, followed by the objectives of a failure analysis. Then, the article discusses the processes involved in failure analysis, including codes and standards. Next, fabrication flaws that can develop into failures of in-service pressure vessels and piping are covered. This is followed by sections discussing in-service mechanical and metallurgical failures, environment-assisted cracking failures, and other damage mechanisms that induce cracking failures. Finally, the article provides information on inspection practices.

Graphitization, the formation of graphite nodules in carbon and low alloy steels, contributes to many failures in high-temperature environments. Three such failures in power-generating systems were analyzed to demonstrate the unpredictable nature of this failure mechanism and its effect on material properties and structures. In general, the more randomly distributed the nodules, the less effect they have on structural integrity. In the cases examined, the nodules were found to be organized in planar arrays, indicating they might have an effect on material properties. Closer inspection, however, revealed that the magnitude of the effect depends on the relative orientation of the planar arrangement and principle tensile stress. For normal orientation, the effect of embrittlement tends to be most severe. Conversely, when the orientation is parallel, the nodules have little or no effect. The cases examined show that knowledge is incomplete in regard to graphitization, and the prediction of its occurrence is not yet possible.

A Ti-6Al-4V alloy pressure vessel failed during a proof-pressure test, fracturing along the center girth weld. The girth joints were welded with the automatic gas tungsten arc process utilizing an auxiliary trailing shield attached to the welding torch to provide inert-gas shielding for the exterior surface of the weld. A segmented backup ring with a gas channel was used inside the vessel to shield the weld root. The pressure vessel failed due to contamination of the fusion zone by oxygen, which resulted when the gas shielding the root face of the weld was diluted by air that leaked into the gas channel. Thermal stresses cracked the embrittled weld, exposing the crack surfaces to oxidation before cooling. One of these cracks caused a stress concentration so severe that failure of the vessel wall during the proof test was inevitable. A sealing system at the split-line region of the segmented backup ring was provided, and a fine-mesh stainless steel screen diffuser was incorporated in the channel section of the backup ring to prevent air from leaking in. A titanium alloy color chart was furnished to permit correlation of weld-zone discoloration with the degree of atmospheric contamination.

During autofrettage of a thick-wall steel pressure vessel, a crack developed through the wall of the component. Certain forged pressure vessels are subjected to autofrettage during their manufacture to induce residual compressive stresses at locations where fatigue cracks may initiate. The results of the autofrettage process, which creates a state of plastic strain in the material, is an increase in the fatigue life of the component. Analysis (visual inspection, 50x/500x unetched micrographs, and electron microprobe analysis) supports the conclusion that the fracture toughness of the steel was exceeded, and failure through the wall occurred because of the following reason: the high level of iron oxide found is highly abnormal in vacuum-degassed steels. Included matter of this nature (exogenous) most likely resulted from scale worked into the surface during forging. Therefore, it is understandable that failure occurred during autofrettage when the section containing these defects was subjected to plastic strains. Because the inclusions were sizable, hard, and extremely irregular, this region would effect substantial stress concentration. No recommendations were made.

A thick-walled tube that was weld fabricated for use as a pressure vessel exhibited cracks. Similar cracking was apparent at the weld toes after postweld stress relief or quench-and-temper heat treatment. The cracks were not detectable by nondestructive examination after welding, immediately prior to heat treatment. Multiple-pass arc welds secured the carbon-steel flanges to the Ni-Cr-Mo-V alloy steel tubes. Investigation (visual inspection, metallographic analysis, and evaluation of the fabrication history and the analysis data) supported the conclusion that the tube failed as a result of stress-relief cracking. Very high residual stresses often result from welding thick sections of hardenable steels, even when preheating is employed. Quenched-and-tempered steels containing vanadium, as well as HSLA steels with a vanadium addition, have been shown to be susceptible to this embrittlement. Manufacturers of susceptible steels recommend use of these materials in the as-welded condition.

A portable propane container with a name-plate soldered onto it exploded in service. When the vessel was inspected afterwards, it was found to have developed a crack in the top end plate. A portion of the end plate cut out to include the midlength and one termination of the crack was examined microscopically. This revealed that the crack was associated with intergranular penetration by molten metal. The microstructure in general was indicative of a good-quality mild steel. It was evident from that solder that was responsible for the penetration and that fused brass from the hand wheel had not played any part. Tensile stress was present at the time of the failure sufficiently high to enable solder penetration to take place. The use of soft solder as a medium for attaching name-plates directly on to stressed steel parts is not recommended. It would be preferable to use a welded-on patch plate or to employ one of the high-strength, non-metallic adhesives.

The clapper in a 250 mm diam disk valve (made from ASTM A36 steel, stress relieved and cadmium plated) fractured at the welded joint between the clapper and a 20 mm diam support rod (also made of same material). The valve contained a stream of gas consisting of 55% H2S, 39% CO2, 5% H2, and 1% hydrocarbons at 40 deg C and 55 kPa during operation. Voids on the fracture surface and evidence of incomplete weld penetration were revealed by examination. Brittle fracture was indicated by the overall appearance through some fatigue beach marks were observed. Very narrow bands of high hardness were revealed at the edges of the weld metal. It was revealed by chemical analysis of this band that a stainless steel filler metal had been used which produced mixed composition at the weld boundaries. The plating material was revealed to be nickel by chemical analysis. It was concluded that clapper failed by fatigue and brittle fracture because it was welded with an incorrect filler metal. A clapper assembly was welded with a low-carbon steel filler metal, then cadmium plated.

Cracking was found in the heads on large Yankee dryers, large, cylindrical, rotating, pressurized, high-temperature, cast iron pressure vessels (ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII, Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels), used to remove moisture from sheets of tissue paper during manufacturing. The typical components consist of a cast iron shell, two cast iron concave heads, and a large cast iron internal center stay attached to journals. The heads are attached to the shell and center stay with high-strength bolts. FEA and metallurgical investigation supported the conclusion that the cracking was caused by an unexpected type of load placed on the machine, namely corrosion product buildup at the head/shell interface causing the joint to displace open. It was also found that compressive bolting loads could slightly open the head/shell interface at the periphery. Recommendations included design changes in the head/shell joint, and detailed preventive maintenance inspection procedures were also suggested.

Three examples of corrosion-fatigue cracking from the toes of substantial fillet welds applied to seal-leaking riveted seams in steam accumulators are described. In the first case, this practice resulted in a disastrous explosion; in the second, which involved two identical vessels at the same location, cracking in course of development was discovered during internal inspection. Microscope examination of several specimens cut to intersect a crack showed it to be typical of corrosion-fatigue; it was in the form of a broad fissure, contained oxide deposits, and the termination was blunt-ended. The two cases not only serve to illustrate the danger of applying fillet welds to seal the lap edges of riveted seams, but point to the inadvisability of employing riveted construction for vessels intended for service under conditions involving frequent pressure and thermal fluctuations, as it is extremely difficult to maintain the tightness of riveted seams under these conditions. Such vessels are now almost exclusively of all-welded construction

The welds joining the liner and shell of a fluid catalytic cracking unit failed. The shell was made of ASTM A515 carbon steel welded with E7018 filler metal. The liner was made of type 405 stainless steel and was plug welded to the shell using ER309 and ER310 stainless steel filler metal. Fine cracks starting inside the weld zone and spreading outward through the weld and toward the surface were observed during examination. Decarburization and graphitization of the carbon steel at the interface was noted. The high carbon level was found to allow martensite to form eventually. The structure was found to be austenitic in the area where the grain-boundary precipitates appeared heaviest. The composition of the precipitates was analyzed using an electron microprobe to reveal presence of sulfur. Microstructural changes in the weld alloy at the interface were interpreted to be caused by dilution of the alloy and the presence of sulfur caused hot shortness. The necessary internal stress to produce extensive cracking was produced by the differential thermal expansion of the carbon and stainless steels. Periodic careful gouging of the affected areas followed by repair welding was recommended.

Following a fracture mechanics “fitness-for-purpose” analysis of petroleum industry cold service pressure vessels, using the British Standard PD 6493, it was realized that an analogous approach could be used for the failure analysis of a similar pressure vessel dome which had failed in service some years previously. The failed pressure vessel, with a diam of 2.5 m and several meters tall, had been made of 12 mm thick IZETT steel plate of the same type and heat treatment as used in the earlier fitness-for-purpose already measured. Examination of the fracture surfaces suggested, from fatigue striations manifested by SEM, that the vessel was subject to significant fatigue cracking, which was probably corrosion assisted. From COD measurements at the operating temperature of -130 deg C (-202 deg F), and a finite stress analysis, a fracture mechanics evaluation using BS PD6493 yielded realistic critical flaw sizes (in the range 51 to 150 mm). These sizes were consistent with the limited fracture surface observations and such flaws could well have been present in the vessel dome prior to catastrophic failure. For similar pressure vessels, an inspection program based on a leak-before-break philosophy was consequently regarded as acceptable.

A large pressure vessel that had been in service as a hydrogen sulfide (H2S) absorber developed cracks and began leaking at a nozzle. The vessel contained a 20% aqueous solution of potassium hydroxide (KOH), potassium carbonate (K2CO3), and arsenic. The vessel wall was manufactured of ASTM A516, grade 70, low-carbon steel plate. A steel angle had been formed into a ring was continuously welded to the inside wall of the vessel. The groove formed by the junction of the lower tray-support weld and the top part of the weld around the nozzle was found to have a crack. Pits and scale near the crack origin were revealed by microscopic examination and cracking was found to be transgranular. Periods of corrosion alternated with sudden instances of cleavage, under a tensile load, along preferred slip planes were interpreted during examination with a microscope. It was concluded that the combination of the residual plus operating stresses and the amount of KOH present would have caused stress corrosion as a result of caustic embrittlement. It was recommended that the tray support should be installed higher on the vessel wall to prevent coincidence of the lower tray-support weld with the nozzle weld.

A portion of the wall of a reactor vessel used in burning impurities from carbon particles failed by localized melting. The vessel was made of Hastelloy X (Ni-22Cr-9Mo-18Fe). Considering the service environment, melting could have been caused either by excessive carburization (which would have lowered the melting point of the alloy markedly) or by overheating. A small specimen containing melted and unmelted metal was removed from the vessel wall and examined metallographically. It was observed that the interface between the melted zone and the unaffected base metal was composed of large grains and enlarged grain boundaries. An area a short distance away from the melted zone was fine grained and relatively free of massive carbides. This evidence supported the conclusion that the vessel failed by melting that resulted from heating to about 1230 to 1260 deg C (2250 to 2300 deg F), which exceeded normal operating temperatures, and carburization was not the principal cause of failure. No recommendations were made.

A forged pressure vessel made from high temperature austenitic steel X8Cr-Ni-MoVNb 16 13 K (DIN 1.4988) failed. The widest part of the burst had fine cracks on the internal wall running longitudinally. When the internal wall was cleaned, numerous even finer cracks were exposed. On the fracture surfaces in this region an irregularly formed zone was visible in the direction of the internal wall and a fibrous oriented fracture zone towards the external wall. The fracture was typical of stress-corrosion cracking in austenitic steels. Vanadium trichloride was present and tensile stresses were of necessity set up by the internal pressure. Stress-corrosion cracking does not occur if one of the basic requirements is lacking. Because the chloride agent and tensile stresses were inevitably present, the only possible way to prevent future reoccurrence is to forge the entire pressure vessel from a material immune to stress-corrosion cracking or to use interchangeable linings of such a material. A nickel alloy could be considered.

A nuclear steam-generator vessel constructed of 100-mm thick SA302, grade B, steel was found to have a small leak. The leak originated in the circumferential closure weld joining the transition cone to the upper shell. The welds had been fabricated from the outside by the submerged arc process with a backing strip. The backing was back gouged off, and the weld was completed from the inside with E8018-C3 electrodes by the shielded metal arc process. Striations of the type normally associated with progressive or fatigue-type failures including beach marks that allowed tracing the origin of the fracture to the pits on the inner surface of the vessel were revealed. Copper deposits with zinc were revealed by EDS examination of discolorations. Pitting was revealed to have been caused by poor oxygen control in the steam generators and release of chloride into the steam generators. It was concluded by series of controlled crack-propagation-rate stress-corrosion tests that A302, grade B, steel was susceptible to transgranular stress-corrosion attack in constant extension rate testing with as low as 1 ppm chloride present. It was recommended to maintain the coolant environment low in oxygen and chloride. Copper ions in solution should be eliminated or minimized.

The maximum life of base-loaded headers and piping is not possible to be predicted until they develop microcracking. The typical elements of a periodic inspection program after the occurrence of the crack was described extensively. Cracks caused by creep swelling in the stub-to-header welds in the secondary superheater outlet headers (constructed of SA335-P11 material) of a major boiler were described as an example. The OD of the header was measured to detect the amount of swelling and found to have increased 1.6% since its installation. Ligament cracks extending from tube seat to tube seat were revealed by surface inspection. Cracks were found to originate from inside the header, extend axially in the tube penetrations and radially from those holes into the ligaments. Cracks in 94 locations, ranging from small radial cracks to full 360Ý cracks were revealed by dye-penetrant inspection. The unit was operated under reduced-temperature conditions and with less load cycling than previously until a redesigned SA335-P22 header was installed.

This article discusses the effect of using unsuitable alloys, metallurgical discontinuities, fabrication practices, and stress raisers on the failure of a pressure vessel. It provides information on pressure vessels made of composite materials and their welding practices. The article explains the failure of pressure vessels with emphasis on stress-corrosion cracking, hydrogen embrittlement, brittle and ductile fractures, creep and stress rupture, and fatigue with examples.