Cerclage wire, which was used with two screws and washers for a tension band in a corrective internal fixation, was found broken at several points and corroded after nine months in service. The material was examined using energy-dispersive x-ray analysis and determined not to be in compliance with standards (type 304 stainless steel without molybdenum). The screws and washers were found to be made of remelted implant-quality type 316L stainless steel and were intact. Signs of sensitization, characterized by chromium carbide precipitates at the grain boundaries, were revealed by the microstructure. Intercrystalline corrosion with pitted grains was indicated by SEM fractography. Improper heat treatment of the steel was interpreted to have led to intercrystalline corrosion and implant separation.

The corner of a welded sheet construction made from austenitic corrosion-resistant chromium-nickel steel showed corrosive attack of the outer sheet. This attack was most severe at the points subjected to the greatest heat during welding. Particularly large amounts of weld metal had been applied. Microscopic examination showed grain disintegration was promoted by the thickness of the weld bead and the amount of heat required to produce it. If nonstabilized austenitic sheet is to be used in the future, one of the particularly low-carbon steels, X2 CrNi 18 9 or X2 CrNiMo 18 10, is recommended.

After about two years in service, a 303 stainless steel valve in contact with a carbonated soft drink in a vending machine occasionally dispensed a discolored drink with a sulfide odor. According to the laboratory at the bottling plant, the soft drink in question was strongly acidic, containing citric and phosphoric acids and having a pH of 2.4 to 2.5. Investigation (visual inspection, chemical analysis, immersion testing in the soft drink, and 100x unetched micrographs) supported the conclusion that the failure was caused by the size and distribution of sulfide stringers in the alloy used in the valve. Manganese sulfide stringers in the valve were exposed at end-grain surfaces in contact with the beverage. The stringers, which were anodic to the surrounding metal, were subject to corrosion, producing a hydrogen sulfide concentration in the immediately adjacent liquid. Recommendations included changing the valve material to type 304 stainless steel.

Cracks occurred in a new ship hull after only three months in service. It was noted that the 5xxx series of aluminum alloys are often selected for weldability and are generally very resistant to corrosion. However, if the material has prolonged exposure at slightly elevated temperatures of 66 to 180 deg C (150 to 350 deg F), an alloy such as 5083 can become susceptible to intergranular corrosion. Investigation (visual inspection, corrosion testing, SEM images) supported the conclusion that the cracks occurred because during exposures to chloride solutions like seawater, galvanic couples formed between precipitates and the alloy matrix, leading to severe intergranular attack. No recommendations were made.

Plate perforation occurred in the cylindrical section and walls of the inlet foot (2.38 mm thick Incoloy 825 plate welded using INCO welding rod 135) of an inert gas fire prevention system in an oil tanker. Cross-sectional microprobe analysis showed the corrosion product to contain sulfur, mainly from the flue gas, and calcium and chlorine, mainly from the sea water. The gray corrosion product was interspersed with rust and a black carbonaceous deposit. Corrosion pitting and poor weld penetration, with carbide precipitation and heavy etching at grain boundaries, indicated sensitization and susceptibility to aqueous intergranular corrosion. Chemical analysis showed the predominant acid radical to be sulfate (6.20% in the carbonaceous deposit and 0.60% in the corrosion product), suggesting that oxidation of SO2 in the flue gas caused the corrosion. Moisture condensation, the carbon acting as a cathode, and alloy susceptibility to intergranular corrosion contributed to the corrosion.

The failure of a 90-10 cupronickel heat exchanger tube resulted in flooding of the vessel and subsequently sinking it. The corrosion of the cupronickel alloy was facilitated by the high sulfur content of the seawater in which it operated. The failure modes were anodic dissolution and copper reprecipitation.

Severely reduced wall thickness was encountered at the liquid line of a lead-bath pan that was used in a continuous strip or wire oil-tempering unit. Replacement of the pan was necessary after six months of service. The pan, 6.9 m (22.5 ft) long, 0.6 m (2 ft) wide, and 38 cm (15 in.) deep with a 2.5-cm (1-in.) wall thickness, was a type 309 stainless steel weldment. Operating temperatures of the lead bath in the pan ranged from 805 deg C (1480 deg F) at the entry end to 845 deg C (1550 deg F) at the exit end. Analysis (visual inspection. metallographic analysis, moisture testing, and etched micrographs using Murakami's reagent) supported the conclusions that thinning of the pan walls at the surface of the molten lead resulted from using coke of high moisture content and from the low fluctuating coke level. Recommendations included reducing the supply of oxygen attacking the grain boundaries and the hydrogen that readily promoted decarburization with the use of dry (2 to 3% moisture content) coke. Maintaining a thick layer of coke over the entire surface of molten lead in the pan would exclude atmospheric oxygen from the grain boundaries.

Over a period of about one year, three RA 330 alloy salt pots from a single heat-treating plant were submitted to failure analysis. All of the pots, which had 9.5 mm thick walls, were used primarily to contain neutral salts at temperatures from about 815 to 900 deg C (1500 to 1650 deg F). However, some cyaniding was also performed in these pots, which, when not in use, were idled at 760 deg C (1400 deg F). It was reported that sludge was removed from the bottom of the pots once a day. Normal pot life varied from about 6 to 20 months. The pots were removed from the furnace, visually inspected, and rotated 120 deg every three weeks to ensure that no single location was overheated for a prolonged period of time. Analysis (visual inspection, chemical analysis, metallographic examination, and x-ray analysis, 60x micrograph etched with 10% oxalic acid) supported the conclusion that the cause of failure of each of the three salt pots was severe intergranular corrosion accompanied by substantial chromium depletion. No recommendations were made.

A routine examination on a seat ejection system found that the catapult attachment swivel fabricated from 7075-T651 aluminum alloy plate contained cracks on opposite sides of the part. This swivel, or bath tub, does not experience extreme loads prior to activation of the catapult system. Some loads could be absorbed however, when the aircraft is subjected to G loads. Visual examination of the part revealed that cracks through the wall thickness initiated on the inner walls of the fixture. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and electron optical examination revealed that the cracking pattern initiated and progressed by an intergranular failure mechanism. It was concluded that failure of the catapult attachment swivel fixture occurred by SCC. It was recommended that the 7075 aluminum ejection seat fixture be supplied in the T-73 temper to minimize susceptibility to SCC.

A preflight inspection found a broken diaphragm from a side controller fabricated from 17-7 PH stainless steel in the RH 950 heat treatment condition. Failure occurred by cracking of the base of the flange-like diaphragm. The crack traveled 360 deg around the diaphragm. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) revealed that the failure occurred by a brittle intergranular mechanism and stress-corrosion cracking (SCC), and indicated a failure mode of selective grain-boundary separation. The diaphragms were heat treated in batches of 25. An improper heat treatment could have resulted in the formation of grain boundary precipitates, including chromium carbides. It was concluded that failure of the diaphragm was due to a combination of sensitization caused by improper heat treatment and subsequent SCC. It was recommended that the remaining 24 sensor diaphragms from the affected batch be removed from service. In addition, a sample from each heat treat batch should be submitted to the Strauss test (ASTM A262, practice E) to determine susceptibility to intergranular corrosion. Also, it was recommended that a stress analysis be performed on the system to determine whether a different heat treatment (which would offer lower strength but higher toughness) could be used for this part.

Two aircraft-engine tailpipes of 19-9 DL stainless steel (AISI type 651) developed cracks along longitudinal gas tungsten arc butt welds after being in service for more than 1000 h. Binocular-microscope examination of the cracks in both tailpipes revealed granular, brittle-appearing surfaces confined to the HAZs of the welds. Microscopic examination of sections transverse to the weld cracks showed severe intergranular corrosion in the HAZ. The fractures appeared to be caused by loss of corrosion resistance due to sensitization, that could have been induced by the temperatures attained during gas tungsten arc welding. Tests demonstrated the presence of sensitization in the HAZ of the gas tungsten arc weld. The aircraft engine tailpipe failures were due to intergranular corrosion in service of the sensitized structure of the HAZs produced during gas tungsten arc welding. All gas tungsten arc welded tailpipes should be postweld annealed by re-solution treatment to redissolve all particles of carbide in the HAZ. Also, it was suggested that resistance seam welding be used, because there would be no corrosion problem with the faster cooling rate characteristic of this technique.

Inspections and microstructural analysis revealed intergranular corrosion of 6061-T6 aluminum alloy aircraft fuel line beneath ferrules. The cause of the corrosion was traced to the fuel line marking process, which involved electrolytic labeling. Although subsequent rinsing of the fuel lines washed off most of the electrolyte, some was trapped between the 6061-T6 tubing and the ferrule. This condition made intergranular corrosion of the fuel lines inevitable. The attack caused grains to become dislodged, giving the appearance of pitting. Corrosion penetrated approximately 0.13 mm (0.005 in.) into the tubing. Experiments indicated that the corrosion products were inactive. It was recommended that another marking process be used that does not involve corrosive materials. The prevention of electrolyte from being trapped between the tubing and ferrules by using a MIL-S-8802 sealant was recommended.

During a routine shear-pin check, the end lug on the barrel of the forward canopy actuator on a naval aircraft was found to have fractured. The lug was forged from aluminum alloy 2014-T6. Investigation (visual inspection, 2x views, and 140X micrographs etched with Keller's reagent) supported the conclusion that the cause of failure was SCC resulting from exposure to a marine environment. The fracture occurred in normal operation at a point where damage from pitting and intergranular corrosion acted as a stress raiser, not because of overload. The pitting and intergranular attack on the lug were evidence that the surface protection of the part had been inadequate as manufactured or had been damaged in service and not properly repaired in routine maintenance. Recommendations included anodizing the lug and barrel in sulfuric acid and giving them a dichromate sealing treatment, followed by application of a coat of paint primer. During routine maintenance checks, a careful examination was suggested to look for damage to the protective coating, and any necessary repairs should be made by cleaning, priming, and painting. Severely corroded parts should be removed from service.

The US Army Research Laboratory performed a failure investigation on a broken main landing gear mount from an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. A component had failed in flight, and initially prevented the helicopter from safely landing. In order to avoid a catastrophe, the pilot had to perform a low hover maneuver to the maintenance facility, where ground crews assembled concrete blocks at the appropriate height to allow the aircraft to safely touch down. The failed part was fabricated from maraging 300 grade steel (2,068 MPa [300 ksi] ultimate tensile strength), and was subjected to visual inspection/light optical microscopy, metallography, electron microscopy, energy dispersive spectroscopy, chemical analysis, and mechanical testing. It was observed that the vacuum cadmium coating adjacent to the fracture plane had worn off and corroded in service, thus allowing pitting corrosion to occur. The failure was hydrogen-assisted and was attributed to stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and/or corrosion fatigue (CF). Contributing to the failure was the fact that the material grain size was approximately double the required size, most likely caused from higher than nominal temperatures during thermal treatment. These large grains offered less resistance to fatigue and SCC. In addition, evidence of titanium-carbo-nitrides was detected at the grain boundaries of this material that was prohibited according to the governing specification. This phase is formed at higher thermal treatment temperatures (consistent with the large grains) and tends to embrittle the alloy. It is possible that this phase may have contributed to the intergranular attack. Recommendations were offered with respect to the use of a dry film lubricant over the cadmium coated region, and the possibility of choosing an alternative material with a lower notch sensitivity. In addition, the temperature at which this alloy is treated must be monitored to prevent coarse grain growth. As a result of this investigation and in an effort to eliminate future failures, ARL assisted in developing a cadmium brush plating procedure, and qualified two Army maintenance facilities for field repair of these components.

New aircraft wing panels extruded from 7075-T6 aluminum exhibited an unusual pattern of circular black interrupted lines, which could not be removed by scouring or light sanding. The panels, subsequent to profiling and machining, were required to be penetrated inspected, shot peened, H2SO4 anodized, and coated with MIL-C-27725 integral fuel tank coating on the rib side. Scanning electron microscopy and microprobe analysis (both conventional energy-dispersive and Auger analyzers) showed that the anodic coating was applied over an improperly cleaned and contaminated surface. The expanding corrosion product had cracked and, in some places, had flaked away the anodized coating. The corrodent had penetrated the base aluminum in the form of subsurface intergranular attack to a depth of 0.035 mm (0.0014 in.). It was recommended that a vapor degreaser be used during cleaning prior to anodizing. A hot inhibited alkaline cleaner was also recommended during cleaning prior to anodizing. The panels should be dichromate sealed after anodizing. The use of deionized water was also recommended during the dichromate sealing operation. In addition, the use of an epoxy primer prior to shipment of the panels was endorsed. Most importantly, surveillance of the anodizing process itself was emphasized.

A 2000-T6 aluminum alloy bracket failed in a coastal environment because corrosive chlorides got between the bracket and attachment bolt. The material used for the part was susceptible to stress corrosion under the service conditions. Cracking may have been aggravated by galvanic action between aluminum alloy bracket and steel bolt. To preclude or minimize recurrences, fittings in service should be inspected periodically by dye penetrant for signs of cracking on the end face and within the fitting hole and protected with a suitable coating to exclude damaging chlorides. Also, a 2000-T6 aluminum alloy swivel fitting experienced intergranular corrosion fracture as the result of stress-accelerated corrosion. Corrosion began because of a loose fit between the aluminum swivel fitting and steel tube assembly, which caused fretting. Inadequate maintenance and/or abnormal service operation may have loosened the fitting.

Two nuts were used to secure the water-supply pipes to the threaded connections on hot-water and cold-water taps. The nut used on the cold-water tap fractured about one week after installation. Examination of the fracture surfaces of the coldwater nut did not reveal any obvious defects to account for the fracture, but there were indications of excessive porosity in the nut. The fracture had occurred through the root of the first thread that was adjacent to the flange of the tap. It was found that the nut from the cold-water tap failed by SCC. Apparently, sufficient stress was developed in the nut to promote this type of failure by normal installation because there was no evidence of excessive tightening of the nut. Corrosion testing of the nuts indicated that the fractured nut was highly susceptible to intergranular corrosion because of either a deficiency in magnesium content or excessive impurities, such as lead, tin, or cadmium. This composition problem with zinc alloys was recognized many years ago, and particular attention has been directed toward ensuring that high-purity zinc is used. This corrective measure reportedly resulted in virtual elimination of this type of defect.

The lock ring of a centrifuge drum was fractured after one year's operation. The ring, with a trapezoidal thread on the inside, was made of steel with approximately 0.5%C-1.3%Mn-1.1%Cr and was hardened and tempered to 105 kp/sq mm strength at 11% elongation (d10). It fractured radially in one of four places in which the cross section was weakened by short grooves that served as tool grips for tightening the cover. The fracture propagated from the base of the thread and followed it in a circumferential direction until it was broken through radially at the top across the ring due to a weakening caused by the external reduction of the cross section. The uppermost turn was corroded at the base by pitting favored by differences in ventilation and formation of Evans elements in the narrow gap between thread and counterthread. Metallographic examination showed that the pitting favored intergranular fissures and therefore it can be established that stress corrosion accelerated cracking of the ring Although since the drum was used for the processing of various liquids, the exact corroding medium cannot be stated.

Cracking occurred in an ASME SB166 Inconel 600 safe-end forging on a nuclear reactor coolant water recirculation nozzle while it was in service. The safe-end was welded to a stainless-steel-clad carbon steel nozzle and a type 316 stainless steel transition metal pipe segment. An Inconel 600 thermal sleeve was welded to the safe-end, and a repair weld had obviously been made on the outside surface of the safe-end to correct a machining error. Initial visual examination of the safe-end disclosed that the cracking extended over approximately 85 deg of the circular circumference of the piece. Investigation (visual inspection, on-site radiographic inspection, limited ultrasonic inspection, chemical analysis, 53x metallographic cross sections and SEM images etched in 8:1 phosphoric acid) supported the conclusion that the cracking mechanism was intergranular SCC. No recommendations were made.

Pendant-style reheater, constructed of ASME SA-213, grade T-11, steel ruptured. A set of four tubes, specified to be 64 mm OD x 3.4 mm minimum wall thickness was examined. A small quantity of loose debris was removed from the inside of one of the tubes. The major constituent was revealed by EDS analysis of the debris to be iron with traces of phosphorus, manganese, sodium, calcium, copper, zinc, potassium, silicon, chromium, and molybdenum. Thus the debris was interpreted to be the scale from ID of the tube with boiler feedwater chemicals from the attemperation spray. The likely cause of failure was concluded to be exfoliation of the scale from the ID surface of the tube. Creep failures were interpreted to be caused by localized temperatures higher than the maximum service temperature. Replacement of the affected tubes was recommended. Inspection of the tubes by radiography to find the circuits with the greatest accumulation of debris and replacing them as necessary was recommended on an annual basis.